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Guillermo Sierra Catalán’s rich, engaging paper, “Acquisition of Knowledge through Narrative
in Argumentative Processes,” opens up a world of suasion and supposition, verisimilitude and
verity, and does so adeptly, using the tools and concepts of contemporary argumentation theory.
He makes a strong case for the ways in which fictional narratives function as reasons and
arguments, arouse passion and action, and enlist even as they test a whole array of inferential
capacities. But is narrative fiction — or fiction in general — in any sense a kind of proof? Do
forms of argument, of proof-making, borrow means and method from narrative, fictive or nonfictive?1 Sierra Catalán’s answers turn on whether or not we share his view that narrative fiction
as a form of testimony, a term that derives from testimonium, testis or ‘witness,’ and -monium,
cousin to -ment in English, denoting an instrument of action (OED, s.v.). To ‘bear witness,’
tesāri, is to attest, to offer attestation, to ‘test’ in the sense of attempt, prove, essay. Testimony is
a form of proof (see, for example, Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 5.11.36ff.) and, since Aristotle,
proof is the heart of rhetoric.
With its focus on addressees, Sierra Catalán makes room for quotidian, everyday
testimony—“a pure first-rate kind of knowledge” to which we appeal frequently and persistently
(pp. 1-2)—as a form of epistemology alongside perception and memory, induction and
introspection. This kind of evidence he terms “natural” as opposed to legal, formal testimony (p.
2). Both are concerned with content, with information conveyed via address, and thus
testimony’s natural home is the actual, the verifiable, and the probable. Fiction, I would argue, is
nestled, somewhat uncomfortably, between “daily life circumstances” and the severity of a law
court—the alembic of testimony before it migrated into early science (see Shapiro, 2002).
Sierra Catalán concedes this point, but does so by claiming that, for it to achieve “equivalence”
with testimony, narrative fiction must simply convey information (p. 2). There seems to me a
feint here, for Sierra Catalán claims that fiction can offer knowledge but nothing about its
epistemic capacity is “specifically fictional” (p. 2); in other words, as knowledge-producing
discourse, fiction courts the same value as any kind of testimony, including non-fiction. In this
argument, fiction’s ‘making strange,’ its ostrenanie, its language and narrative forms, its
“representational means,” are either redundant or insipid, superfluous or wan. In order to press
fiction into epistemic service it must be denuded and re-naturalised. Late in the essay, Sierra
Catalán attempts a recovery by arguing that, because of its connative and aesthetic dimensions or
“merits,” a “literary narrative a source of more pieces of knowledge than a non-literary one” (p.
10, my emphasis). More is more, then: But what precisely are the epistemic effects of these
‘merits’? To this question, Sierra Catalán answers ‘imagination,’ phantasia, a notoriously
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I am aware of the long-standing, and ongoing, philosophical debates about these questions, spurred by
Lewis (1978). Replies to his paper are legion. My purpose here is to briefly inquire into the relationships between
rhetoric and proof, fiction and narrative.

1

antinomian faculty, which functions powerfully but fallibly, at least in the intellectual history I
study.
Early in his robust argument, Sierra Catalán avers that:
the point of fiction is to imagine, that is, to know (or pretend to know, or act as if one is
knowing) certain things about a possible world, different from the real one. So, it is
reasonable to understand fiction narrative (a narrative about a possible world) as the
representation of a narrative about the real world — that is, the representation of
testimony. ... [I have] shown that the epistemic values associated with testimonies —
non-fiction narratives — and representations of testimonies — fiction narratives —
coincide. (p. 3, slightly amended)
This ‘coincidence’ of fictive and non-fictive narratives is founded on the “reliability” of the text
or discourse: Sierra Catalán relies on the “commonly accepted assumption that the more correct a
claim is, the more accurate is the representation of the world it offers and, consequently, the
more knowledge about the real world it generates” (pp. 4-5, 8, 9). This sleight riles: Fiction only
has a claim on the world insofar as it is “accurate.” Accuracy trumps plausibility, verisimilitude,
even fantasy? The claim neuters itself, and is further diminished by Sierra Catalán’s reliance on
the notion of “internal coherence,” borrowed from Walter Fisher, that fails to illuminate any one
of a number of famous avant garde or ‘experimental’ narrative or quasi-narrative works of fiction
(pp. 6-7). One might quibble, too, that much contemporary, especially popular, fiction has little
truck with accuracy, especially when it comes to the filigree complexity of feeling, or to building
equitable fictive spaces for negotiating ethical strictures with the fustian, messy, and sometimes
amoral behaviour of its characters or of actual people. One might point to E. L. James’s Fifty
Shades of Grey (2011) for only the most famous recent example (it withers on every single page,
and miscarries spectacularly to offer anything like ‘accuracy’); and I certainly would not take
Brendan Behan’s Borstal Boy (1958), as brilliant as it is, as a spur to action or a model of
practice, even for a ‘possible world.’ The rebarbative satire of the eighteenth century evidences
the relationship between history and style: but what have we to learn about ‘possible worlds’
from Alexander Pope’s highly redacted burlesques of forgotten members of parliament?
Christopher Hill (1989, p. 23) reports that a translation of Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667; 1674)
was one of the most popular books amongst the peasant soldiers in the tsar’s armies during the
Russo-Japanese war, 1905-1906. What can one make of that? Assertions about what and how
fiction and popular fiction are consumed are necessarily vexed, provisional, as Q. D. Leavis’
Fiction and the Reading Public (1932) demonstrated almost a hundred years ago.
Sierra Catalán quotes Garcia-Carpintero to the effect that ‘communicative intention’ aims
to “put an intended audience in a position to make believe (imagine) ... [a] proposition” (p. 3).
What is such a ‘position’? To my mind, it stipulates two conditions: the possibility of enargeia,
or vividly presenting one’s subject matter, and the notion that a single mental faculty is devoted
to evaluating both the true and the verisimilar. Both notions are Aristotelian in origin, but were
taken up with verve by his Roman followers and by countless early modern theorists of poetry,
fiction, narrative, and the sermon. Enargeia and its cognate terms, illustratio, hypotyposis,
repraesentatio, and evidentia, denote vividness of description, so that a subject, a narrative, an
argument appear to unfold, actively, before-the-eyes, of an audience or a judge. As Quintilian
put it, using the trope enargeia “makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual
2

scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual
occurrence” (6.2.32; cf. 8.3.61). Often confused with energeia in early modern discourse,
enargeia enables a rhetor to make the absent present, the present estranged—which is in fact a
common definition of rhetoric itself. Francis Bacon’s conception of the discipline, for example,
rests on its relationship to images received by the senses or conjured by the imagination: “the end
of rhetoric is to fill the imagination with observations and images, to second reason, and not to
oppress it” (Works, 4.455-456). The subject of rhetoric is “Imaginative or Insinuative Reason”
(3.383). Precisely this capacity is one of the stipulations of Sierra Catalán’s position. It is not
new.
The other substratum that undergirds his argument is, I think, the relationship between
truth and fiction, rhetoric and proof—in fact he mentions rhetoric and “rhetorical devices” (p. 7).
‘Artistic method,’ technique, is concerned with proof, as Aristotle writes: since demonstration in
the mutable, suasive world, in which ‘things might be otherwise,’ is, in part, enthymemic, the
most adept at persuasion are those who are “best able to see from what materials, and how, a
syllogism arises.” But there is a caveat: this holds true only “if he grasps what sort of things an
enthymeme is concerned with and what differences it has from a logical syllogism.” Why? It
“belongs to the same capacity both to see the true and what resembles the true, and at the same
time humans have a natural disposition for the true and to a large extent hit on the truth: thus, an
ability to aim at commonly held opinions is a characteristic of one who also has a similar ability
in regard to the truth” (1355a3ff.). Truth and fiction share a home. This ability or capacity is
similar to the faculty of those who can ‘see’ (the term is close to ‘imagine’ and to ‘theorise’) to
make resonant metaphors: such figures ‘strike’ people, surprise them, and bring things “more
intimately before our eyes” (Rhetoric, 1404a10-12, 1405a37-b10). To know or pretend to know
by imagining depends on a rhetorical capacity, on the ability to winnow or to confect the true
from the verisimilar, on making and remaking images: “the greatest thing by far is to be a master
of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius,
since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars” (Poetics,
1457b7ff., 1459a5-8). A figure that arouses emotion, vividly, that makes the absent present, that
redescribes the familiar, is fiction’s claim to knowledge or at least to means for inferring,
inducing, and securing knowledge.
But there is another way of envisioning this contention. In a series of lectures delivered
in 1995, the historican Carlo Ginzburg reasserted the central of both proof and narrative to
historical inquiry. ‘Narrative history,’ he insists, underwrites “every form of historical research
and writing,” shifting our attention in order to “explore the mutual interaction between empirical
data and narrative constraints within the process of research itself. Many years ago,” he
continues, “Lucien Febvre remarked that historical evidence speaks only if properly addressed.”
This form of address—and Sierra Catalán is concerned with address—means recognising that
narratives mediate and shape, structure and disclose questions asked of evidence as well as the
ways in which evidence is collected, discarded, interpreted, and written. These, of course, are
questions of proof, at the “fundamental core” not only of historical inquiry but of rhetoric.
Narrative gives shape to argument, one might claim, for “narrative models” intervene “at every
stage of research, creating both roadblocks and possibilities.” Such constructions, narrative
constructions, are far from incompatible with proof or, as Ginzburg insists, with desire and
imagination, “without which there is no research” (1999, pp. 103, 101, 50, 25). Sierra Catalán’s
argument inverted, then: non-fiction must use one of the tools of fiction to organise, substantiate,
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and represent its claims.
Sierra Catalán is right to focus on inference and imagination as sustaining both reasons
and arguments, particularly in fictive, narrative discourse, but I would add additional capacities:
we infer and build, find satisfying and frustrating, the possible worlds that fiction and nonfiction, and the shifting boundaries between them, hold on offer. Our reasonings in response to a
text’s arguments are not only provisional, intensified, modified, or jettisoned as we proceed.
They are also free. As Sartre wrote in 1949, all literary work is an “appeal” to the freedom of
readers to collaborate in the production of the text. That production is uneven because, for the
reader, “all is to do and all is already done; the work exists only at the exact level of his
capacities; while he reads and creates, he knows that he can always go further in his reading, can
always create more profoundly, and thus the work seems to him as inexhaustible and opaque as
things.” Sartre insists on a “pact” of generosity and trust between writers and readers, disclosed
by the “dialectical going-and-coming” that is reading itself, its mooted expectations and demands
by both figures, at “the highest pitch.” This appeal is ethical: “my freedom, by revealing itself,
reveals the freedom of the other.” If fiction speaks to possible worlds, as it must, if fiction is
moored to questions of probability, even fidelity and accuracy, is it often is, these worlds entail
not only freedom, but a form of moral commitment: “You are perfectly free to leave that book
on the table. But if you open it, you assume responsibility for it” (1988, pp. 54, 61-62, 66). I
return, then, as riposte, this form of basic knowledge, to use his terms, and of commitment and
responsibility, in Sartre’s, to Guillermo Sierra Catalán.
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